



Which organization model is appropriatefor a cooperative enterprise depends onthe pre-
requisites in its business environment. When conditions are changing, the firm must adapt
itself. TheentryofSweden,Finland, andAustriaintotheEuropeanUnionledto radicalchanges
for agricultural cooperation, especially for Swedishcooperatives since agricultural policy was
notallowed a transitionalperiod.Aftertwoyears,Swedishcooperatives havestill notadapted
theirorganization model despite pooragricultural profitability. The hinderingfactors are con-
servatism among members and difficult institutional conditions with regard to legislation
and public opinion.
Determinants of Cooperative Models
The conceptofcooperative organization is far from homogeneous. There are
many forms of cooperative organization, and there are decisive differences in
how they are organized and how theywork (Barton 1989; Van Dijk 1996; Ollila
and Nilsson 1997)-ranging from the new generation model in the Midwest
(Egerstrom 1994; Cook 1997) to socially involved and government-supported
cooperation in the Mediterranean zone (Chomel and Vienny 1996; Marini and
Zevi 1996; Monzon 1996). Between these extremes are found, for example, the
traditional cooperative model, with roots in the Rochdale pioneers society, and
the proportionalmodel originatingfrom Emelianoff (1942), Robotka (1947) and
Phillips (1953). In addition, there exist models that have properties inherited
from different national cooperative pioneers, such as Raiffeisen and Schultze-
Delitzsch.
The difference between cooperative models is, fundamentally, how the rela-
tionships between the society and its members are formed-ultimately this is a
question involvingrules governingownership. These relationshipscancontaina
widelyvaryingsetofrightsandobligations thatdetermineshow thecooperative
functions for the members and acts in relation to sales markets, capital markets,
authorities, and other interested parties.
Sometimesitis asserted thatonespecific cooperativemodelis superiorto oth-
ers, butit is difficult to accept such statements since conditions in business envi-
ronments may differ widely. The contingency approach of organization theory
offers a better solution (Lawrence and Lorsch 1969; Kast and Rosenzweig 1979):
Which model is the best for a cooperative depends on its economic, political!
legal, and social conditions. As is the case with all organizations, a cooperative
must reflect its environment. However, there may be a problem if different parts
of the environmentplace contrasting demands on the cooperative, whichwould
make it impossible to achieve the fit required by thecontingency theory.
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Economic factors
When cooperatives market the products of their members at a given market
price, and when they have large economies of scale in their activities, there are
strong economic arguments for the traditional cooperative model. The continu-
ously downward sloping average cost curve results in members getting greater
profitsfor larger volume. Itis frequently asserted thatcooperatives traditionally
have volume maximization as their goal. To achieve volume increases, a number
oforganizational measures canbe used, for example:
• The fact thatcooperativefirms are organized in the form ofsocieties means
that it is easy to include new members and thus suppliers. This is strength-
ened as a result of the societies being open.
• Existing members can increase their deliveries, and new members can be
recruited if the cooperative offers high prices for raw products. This canbe
achieved by paying low, or even zero, interest on member shares and as a
resultof the societyworkingwithunallocated capitalthatdoes notdemand
any return.
• In the traditional cooperative model there are often subsidies between dif-
ferent member categories. When freight is paid by the society, the well-lo-
catedmembersaresupportingthosewhoarepoorlylocated. Lowentryfees
implythatoldermembersassistyoungerpeoplein joiningthesociety. Thus,
supplies will be obtained from farmers that otherwise would be unable to
produceprofitably.
• Theburdenthatdelivery obligationsimplycanbe toleratedbya memberif
he or she knows that the volume will then increase so that the average cost
will decrease.
• New members can more easily be recruited if they experience a low risk
associated with joining the society. Contributory factors in this respect are
the equality principle and the principle of one member-one vote. The ex-
istingmembersofferthesebenefitsinorderto reapeconomiesofscale inthe
cooperative's production.
• Surplus capacity in production plants is commonly found, which finds ex-
pression in the fact that the societies wantto expand. Frequently the activi-
ties are concentrated to one single raw product, which canbe handled on a
correspondingly larger scale.
• To recruit and retain members, use is oftenmade of ideological arguments,
such as solidarity, fairness, and even altruism.
Iftheaverage costcurveand the price curverunparallel to eachother, then no
profits canbemade byincreasing thevolume. One explanationmightbethat the
costcurvehasleveledout, anotherthatthepriceis nolongera givenmarketprice
but decreases with the firm's volume, i.e., the firm hasbecome dominating in its
old market or has entered new sub-markets where it is dominating.
Inthissituation, the societyhasreasontoloweritscostlevelbyeliminatingthe
production-stimulatingelementsinthetraditionalcooperativemodelsince, when
considered in isolation, they probably inhibit efficiency. The well-located mem-
bershouldnot payhaulagecostsfor thosewhoare poorlylocated; newmembers
should notbe allowed cheap entryinto the society; theraw productpriceshould
correspond to the product's sales value. Service at cost will thus be a leading
principleintherelationsbetweenthesocietyandits members,aswellas between64 Journal of Cooperatives 1997
themembers(Knutson 1985; Cotterill1987; Royer1992; Parnell1995). Thesociety
becomesindividualizedand theideologicalmotivesfall intotheshadows. Thisis
where the proportionalcooperativemodel evolves.
Ifa cooperativehas an average cost curve ata minimumlevel, there is no rea-
sonfor ittoeitherincrease ordecreaseits productionvolume. Here, thepreferred
approachis a closed membershiporganizationwithdeliverycontracts and other
propertiesfrom theproportionalmodel.Withnegotiablememberrights, the soci-
etyis also assuredthatitsmembershipwillconsistofthemostefficientfarmers.If
this concerns value-added products, this might very well be a new generation
cooperative model.
Political factors
Anotherfactor thatcooperativeorganizationsmustadaptthemselvesto is legisla-
tion. InEuropetherearefourdifferentkindsofcooperativelegislation(Hofkens1995).
The mostliberalkinds areinDenmark, Norway, Ireland,and theUnitedKing-
domwhere, inprinciple, there isno cooperative legislation, whichmeansthatcoop-
eratives can design their activities extremely freely. In the Netherlands there is a
law on cooperative associations, whichimplies that cooperatives canbe innovative
in financing, business activities, organizational structure, etc. Laws on cooperative
societies are found in several countries like Germany, Belgium, Sweden, and Fin-
land where there are comprehensive regulations on financial conditions, mem-
bership control, accountingand auditing, etc. Finally, most Mediterraneancoun-
tries havelegislation on cooperatives with asocial role. Herecooperativesareexpected
tocontributeto varioussocialareaslike regionaldevelopment,democraticdevel-
opment,and controlof unemployment.
Legislation oncooperativesocieties, naturally, is ofgreatimportancefor coopera-
tive organizationmodels, butgenerallythese lawsaresubordinatetoeconomiccon-
ditions. Nonetheless, it is difficult to understand the south-European cooperative
movementfrom aneconomic perspective-itdemandsa widersocial perspective.
Agricultural policy also appears to beranked higherthan cooperativelegisla-
tion as a reasoncooperativesadopta certainorganizationalmodel. Thisis under-
standable since the policy establishes the economic conditions for the coopera-
tives.Agriculturalpolicydetermineswhatthetermefficiencyimplies-depending
on the type of agricultural policy, skillful lobbying may be more profitable than
economic rationality. Despite agricultural cooperative sectors in Denmark and
Norwayhaving similarlaws oncooperatives, theyare vastly different due to the
differences inagriculturalpolicy. TheDanishareexport-aligned,market-oriented,
and progressive (Sogaard 1994), whereas theNorwegiansarealigned toward the
domestic market, politicized, and boundby tradition.
Social factors
Naturally, thewaya cooperative is organized depends also on the views ofits
members. One may expect that members organize their cooperative in such a
way thatit corresponds to theeconomicand legal conditions. Given these condi-
tions, thememberswillattempt, throughtheircooperative,toreducecertaintypes
of transaction costs found on the markets (Bonus 1986; Nilsson 1994). However,
problemsmayarise if there aredifferingopinionsamong themembers-ifdiffer-
ent member categories have conflicting views or if the members want the coop-
erative to solve conflicting problems.Inertia in Cooperative Remodeling/Nilsson 65
Aim of the Paper
Usingtheabovediscussion as startingpoint, onemaywonderwhathappensin
anagriculturalcooperativesectorwhenconditions changerapidlyanddrastically.
Canthe prevailingcooperativemodelbe replaced withanotherthatbettercorre-
sponds to the new economic conditions? This paperexplores this question.
The situation described above occurred when the European Union widened its
membership in early 1995 to include Sweden, Finland, and Austria. In each ofthe
threecountries,therewasa nationalagriculturalpolicythatresultedintheagricul-
turalcooperativesworkingaccordingtoatraditionalcooperativemodel.Overnight,
the agricultural policy of the European Union was introduced, giving completely
different marketconditions-and demandinga different cooperative model.
There were, however, differences between the three countries. Finland and
Austria negotiated a five-year transitionalperiod duringwhich nationalsupport
waspermittedbutwitha successivereduction. Swedendid notexperiencesucha
transitionalperiod,so here therewasa massivechangeofsystemfrom onedayto
the next. No study has yet been made of how Swedish agriculture has been af-
fected by the membership. Preliminary studies in Finland indicate that massive
changes have taken place, for example, a drop in turnover of 22 percent for one
cooperative slaughterhouse (Aaltonen 1996).
The Swedish Agricultural Cooperative Model
The modern history of Swedish agricultural cooperation started in 1850. The
first societies were modeled on the German approach and were, thus, of the
Raiffeisen type (Book and Johansson 1988). During the first decades, Swedish
agricultural cooperation was successful in the same way as, for example, that of
the Danish. The societies were marketoriented; expansionwas stable; exporting
was successful (Utterstrom 1980). However, following the depression, there was
strong politicization in the 1930s. Agriculture was given state support to main-
tainfood supplies, and the cooperative societies got an important role in admin-
istering agricultural policy.
Agriculturalpolicygraduallybecameincreasinglycomprehensive (Micheletti
1990). In principle, all branches of productionbecame regulated. The state guar-
anteed minimumprices; productionquotaswereintroducedincertainindustries;
thesocieties weregivenmonopolyrightswithindefinedregions; thestatefinanced
thelosses inexports, etc.As the governmentwanteda strongnegotiationpartner,
centralizationofagriculturalcooperationwasencouraged.Thecountry-widefed-
erationofagriculturalcooperatives becameverypowerfulwith respect to policy
and over regional and local societies. This has contributed to a homogenization
thatremains-allsocietieswithinoneindustryworkinalmostthesameway, and
there are great similarities between cooperatives in different industries.
As the decades passed,thecosts ofagriculturalpolicybecamegigantic-these
costs took the form ofstate subsidies and inefficient agriculture. Criticismofthis
waste became so strong that, in 1990, Parliament decided to abolish the entire
agricultural policy. Sweden would be the only country in the world, apart from
New Zealand, with a completely deregulated agricultural system. A successive
deregulationwas to take place overa period offive years, afterwhichall product
prices would be on the world market level. A large proportion of Swedish agri-
culture would probablyhave been eradicated.
Shortlyafterward,discussionsonSweden'smembershipintheEuropeanUnion
started. Following a referendum, Sweden became a member state onJanuary 1,66 Journal of Cooperatives 1997
1995. In connectionwith thegovernment'smembershipapplication, workonthe
deregulation ofagricultural policy was stopped.Itwas considered unsuitable to
first movetowardincreased deregulationifSwedenwas to besubsequentlygov-
ernedby the European Union's agricultural policy. Thus, deregulation was com-
pleted to less than half the extent originally planned.
At the time ofboththe decision onderegulation and entryinto the Union, agri-
cultural cooperation was organized according to a traditional cooperative model.
Sales prices were relatively stable. The businesses of the societies were focused on
volume and large-scale production. Unallocated capital was strongly dominating.
There were considerable subsidies, mainly flowing from effective farmers to less
effective ones. Members were given no interest on their allocated capital. Product
prices to farmers were not differentiated to any great extent. Ideological concep-
tionsaboutsolidarityandequalityweremoreimportantdecisioncriteriathanprof-
itabilityarguments. The domestic marketwas regarded as uniform instead ofseg-
mented, and market adaptation was poor. There was no competitionbetween the
Swedish cooperatives, and the state prevented large volumes of imported prod-
ucts. Exports consisted ofstate-subsidized marketing ofbulkproducts.
Table 1 illustrates key data in Swedish agricultural cooperation. The question
is nowwhetherthesecooperatives can adapt themselves to internationalcompe-
tition,wherethecompetitorshavemorefavorable productionconditionsandlong
TABLE I. Statistics on Agricultural Cooperatives in Sweden, 1994 (Various
sources) (I SEK = 0.15 USD)
Industry Number of Turnover Turnover Turnover Numberof Market
Primary Total Largest Smallest Members Share
Cooperatives Cooperative Cooperative
bill. SEK bill. SEK bill. SEK thousand percent






dairy 8 27 11 0.01 19 99




forestry 8 11 6 0.2 87 50
seed and ripe 18 0.9 24 100
starch 1 0.7 2 100
eggs 1 0.5 0.4 44
animal breeding 22 0.4 0.1 0.01 31 100
sugar beets 5 0.4 5 100
vegetables 14 0.1 1 40
fur animals 1 0.1 0.4 100
potatoes 25 0.006 2
agricultural credit 10
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experience in internationalactivities. In the new market situation there is reason
to think in terms of market adaptation and efficiency at all levels. What is now
required is a transition of the cooperative model, toward strong features of pro-
portionality and service at cost.
Efficiency-Raising Measures
To convert a regulated and production-oriented sector to a competition-ex-
posedandmarket-orientedagriculture,cost reductionsandimprovedmarketing
skills are required. When prices were established in negotiations with the state,
there were weak incentives for rational production. To the extent that societies
did not sell to the state they had a protected position on their regional markets.
Now, when price levels are determined by imports from other European Union
countries, prices have fallen by up to one-fourth, mainly for meat but also for
many dairy products. Farmers, however, have had somecompensationby direct
support from the Union's agricultural policy. The grain industry is less affected,
notleastbecause ofmassive economic supportfrom the EuropeanUnion.
During recent years, there have been considerable efficiency-raising measures,
butthesehavebeeninsufficientandhavenotbeensimilarinallpartsoftheproduc-
tion chain. Costreductions havebeenmadeprimarilyin agriculturalcooperatives'
operations. Numerous plants have been closed, and more than one-third of the
employees have been dismissed despite an almost unaltered production volume.
During the days of national policy, one could afford to have a very fine-meshed
production structure. The plants were only a fraction of the size of those in Den-
mark, that today are the main competitors. However, the Swedish societies can
never reach the Danishlevel of processing costs, and thereby, ultimately, of profit-
ability, due to disadvantages of geographyand too-small productionvolumes.
Costs of primary production have not been lowered as much as costs of pro-
cessing. Farmershavenotacceptedthese efficiency-raisingmeasuresamongthem-
selves, buttodaya structuralmeasure to increase efficiency is onits way. There is
a strongtrend toward largerand fewer farms. Today, most animal producers (in-
cludingthose involved in milk production) are notprofitable since their societies
havebeen unable to payprices that are noticeably higher thanwhat correspond-
ing products cost on theinternational market.
As a result of European Union (EU) supportprograms, however, it is not cer-
tain that those farmers who are still inbusiness are the mostefficientones. These
support programs are distorting market mechanisms. In many cases, inefficient
farmers can survive with money from Brussels, while, in some cases, fairly effi-
cient farmers might have to stop their operations as they can not manage the
competitionwith the strongly supported farmers.
To some extent, the efficiency increase experienced by cooperative societies
hasbeenachievedbymergers. Thisdevelopmenthasnowreachedthepointwhere
the Competition Board does not allow the largest societies to merge any longer,
even if these are generally smaller than their foremost European competitors.
During recent years, the Swedish agricultural cooperatives have established a
large number of ventures, mainlywith other European cooperatives.
Marketing
Major efforts have been made on the marketing side, but, so far, the effects
have not been sufficient (Hendriks and van de Klundert 1995). Marketing skills68 Journal of Cooperatives 1997
of traditionally production-oriented agricultural cooperatives are weaker than
among foreign competitors. This is illustrated by the flow of products over bor-
ders. The Swedish cooperatives' export volumes are quite insignificant. At the
sametimeimports, primarilyfrom Denmark,theNetherlands,andIreland, have
increased strongly. These countries are able to haveprofitable sales at prices that
hardly coverSwedishproduction costs.
Swedish producers try to overcome their cost handicap by marketing high-
quality products, particularly profiled as ethical products, hoping to reach less
price-sensitive consumers. Regarding animalwelfareand ecological production,
Swedishproductionis probablyamongthebestintheworld, thoughthecostsare
veryhigh. Onthe domestic market, this ethicalconcepthasbeenofsomesuccess,
but since the concept is applied to the entire market it is impossible to get suffi-
ciently high prices. The ethically oriented market segment may buy at the same
low prices as the rest of the market, and the market price level is set by the im-
portedproducts,producedatlowcosts. NoSwedishproductionis adaptedto the
price-sensitive marketsegments.
The decision to produceand market all Swedishproducts ethically (withcon-
siderations for ecology and animal welfare) was not based on market consider-
ations. This representsa legaldemand thatthefederation ofSwedishagricultural
cooperatives has decided to promote.
The pricedisadvantagebecomesevenclearer whenSwedishcooperatives sell
on international markets. The sales arguments are the same, that is, ethical. A
limiteddegreeofsuccess hasbeenachieved, e.g., among Belgianand British gro-
cery chains with high-quality profiles. This, however, is hardlya profitable busi-
ness for Swedish cooperatives.
A New Cooperative Model?
Members
Following the change of system in agriculture, many farmers have started to
thinkalong new lines, but among most ofthem no radical change has occurred.
Realizationthatmarketforces nowprevailhasnotpenetratedtoall. Instead,most
farmers continue to believe that somebody else will solve their problems. Agri-
cultural policy-mainly the old national policy but also the European Union
policy-appears to create a paralyzed mentality. Traditional cooperative values
dominate among farmers: for example, values relating to fairness and solidarity
are lodestars for cooperative enterprises. A more business-like attitude is found
largely among the youngerfarmers (Hakelius 1996).
Duringthe days of national agricultural policy, the cooperativeswerebuiltup
according to a traditional model with, e.g., subsidies between different member-
shipcategories. Despitethecooperativesocietiestodaybeingincompetitionwith
all other food producers in the European Union, they have retained these subsi-
dies. Well-locatedfarmers subsidizethosethatarelesswelllocatedwhenthetrans-
port costs are paid by the society. Older farmers subsidize younger farmers as a
result of the system for member investments in the societies. Efficient farmers
subsidize less efficient farmers on account oflimited price differentiation.
Despitecompetitiontodaybetweenall food producersintheEuropeanUnion,
many still hold the opinion that the societies should operate within specific re-
gions.Ifa wholesalerwithinonesociety'sregionbuysfrom anothersociety, there
maybedemonstrationsandletters to the newspapers. Voices assertingthatprod-Inertia in Cooperative Remodeling/Nilsson 69
uctpricesshouldbedeterminedbyproductioncosts and notbythe marketvalue
of the products are still being heard.
The numerous decisions to close unnecessary production plants have often
beenachieved withoutcomplaint,butthere are also examples where the farmers
haveprotestedagainst,for example,a slaughter-housebeingclosedintheirneigh-
borhood. Local patriotism and tradition are often stronger arguments than cost-
savingsand,thus, productprices. Theboardsandmanagersare, ofcourse, aware
of the fact that membersreasoninnon-economic terms and, so, they risk waiting
too longbefore reaching decisions on structural rationalizations.
The traditional viewpoints among members are passed on to the boards and
managers. That the leaders have good knowledge ofwhat the marketrequires is
well documented, but they cannot neglect the opinions among their member-
ships. So far, therehavenotbeenanymajorreplacements ofboardsordirectorsas
a result of the change of system; none of the societies have rules governing the
maximum time directors may retain their appointments.
Legislationdemandsthatall societiesadhere to theprincipleofonemember-
one vote. Since most societies have a strong majority of small, elderly, or part-
time farmers, this favors resistance to change. Some groups of farmers have in-
comes other than from farming and, thus, do not have such strong motives to
ensure that the societies are operated with the highestpossible efficiency.
Legislation
In general, there is a negative view of agricultural cooperation inSwedish so-
ciety (Nilsson 1996). Onereason is thatagricultural policy gave cooperative soci-
eties a dominating position, and, even today, they are often spoken of as being
monopolistic. Additionally, bad will is generated by the fact that the Swedish
cooperativemodelhassuchlargecollectivefeatures-eooperationis oftenregarded
as a socialistic form of organization. For example, the societies' equity capital
consists of 80 to 90 percent unallocated equity. Further, many academics use
agency-theoretical arguments to assert that there is a lack of owner control and
ineffective allocation of resources (Vitaliano 1983).
This lack of legitimacy is found bothamong the general public and among dif-
ferent groupsofpeoplein power. Thegeneralpublicbelievesfarmers still havejust
as good an economy as they had during the days of national agricultural policy
Manypoliticiansareinfluencedbyacademics and non-cooperativemanagerswho
consider cooperation to be an out-dated and ineffective business form. Since the
farmers make up less than 2 percent of the electorate, their political role is very
limited. In thecabinetoffices therearecivil servantswhoconsiderthatdominance,
standardization, and centralization are properties incorporated in cooperative ac-
tivities. Thus, there are powerfulforces workingagainst cooperativebusinesses.
Most of the legislation that regulates agricultural cooperation today is still in-
fluenced by the national agricultural policy. The current law on cooperatives is
based on International Cooperative Alliance principles from 1966. When these
principles wereelaborated theywerelargelyfocused onthe situationconcerning
Europeanconsumercooperation,and,so, ideologicalconsiderationswereallowed
to dominate over economic ones. When the Swedish law came into force in 1987
there werenoobjections from agricultural cooperativeseventhough it wasobvi-
ousthatefficiency mightsuffer-theagriculturalpolicywasstill theretoprovide
a safety net. Thus, the law places demands on openness, low interest rates on70 Journal of Cooperatives 1997
memberinvestments, equalvoting rights, etc.-thetraditional cooperative orga-
nization model.
In 1996, anofficial inquirypresenteda numberofproposalsrelating to theliberal-
izationof the cooperative legislation. The intentionwas thatit shouldbepossible to
conduct effective, market-oriented cooperation. The proposals havebeen positively
received, andit appears probablethat, after1997, thesocieties willbeallowed to pay
a good rate of interest on deposits, have closed memberships, negotiable Bshares,
differentialvoting rights, possibilitiesto increase individualownership, etc.
Another problematic piece of legislation is the Law on Competition. The na-
tional agricultural policy gave agricultural cooperatives a dominating position
with regional monopolies-and, even today, theydominate the market. This has
nowled to a law oncompetition that discriminates againstagricultural coopera-
tives. Its intention is to help non-cooperative competitors gain market strength,
whileputtingup restrictions for thecooperatives. Thus, bargainingcooperatives
andfederated organizationswithproductionoperationsare,inprinciple, prohib-
ited. Delivery obligations are not allowed. When a member resigns, his or her
allocated capital mustberedeemed verysoon. Supplycooperatives and market-
ing cooperatives are treated equally. There is a government authority with im-
mense power, but whereaversion to cooperation is evident.
In 1995, anofficialinquirywas heldintothis LawonCompetition. Theinquiry
illustrated thatSwedishcompetitionpolicyrelatingto cooperationdivergesfrom
corresponding legislation in other European countries and that it is in conflict
withavailable theory. Oneoftheexperts consulted in thisworkwas Richard Sex-
ton, buthis argumentswerewaved asideas beingbasedonAmerican theoryand
thus not applicable to Sweden (Sexton 1995). The divergences with other coun-
tries were denied. There was, thus, a lack of political will to modify the law on
competition. (The author took part as an expert in both this official inquiry and
the revision of the cooperative law.)
This lack of understanding of the situation in agriculture regarding interna-
tional competitionis also found in numerous otheraspects ofpolicy. Incompari-
son with competing countries, Swedish farmers face high taxation pressure re-
garding taxation of income, real estate, fuel, pesticides, etc.
Thecostlevelinagricultureis also increased asa resultoflegislationonanimal
welfare and ecology, which is more restrictive than in any comparable country.
Theselawscameintoforce duringtheagriculturalpolicyperiod,whenhighcosts
couldbe compensatedby the state,butthey have remained unaltered.Addition-
ally, politicians,thegeneralpublic,andcivil servantsrefuse toperceivethathigher
costs have the effect of reducing competitiveness. In some cases, the ecological
and animal welfare measures have led to production costs in Sweden being 10
percent higher thanin the neighboring country ofDenmark.
The national organization of agricultural cooperatives has attempted to ex-
ploittheecologyandanimalwelfarelegislationasa marketingargumentdirected
atinterestedconsumermarkets. To givegreaterimpact,theregulationshavebeen
widened with internal rules but, naturally, with the result that the production
costs have become even higher. Within the federation a special "Swedish con-
cept" has been developed that is marketed as "On the road to the cleanest agri-
cultureintheworld," whichis sometimesironicallyrephrasedas "Ontheroad to
the mostexpensiveagriculture intheworld."All agricultural cooperative societ-
ies in Sweden are involved in this project.Inertia in Cooperative Remodeling/Nilsson 71
Conclusions
There are occasions when cooperative organizations should convert from one
cooperativemodeltoanother, thatis, whenchangesoccurintheeconomic,politi-
cal, and social environments. Probably, cooperative failures largely depend on
such changes not being introduced orbeing introduced too late.
Swedishagriculturalcooperationis largelyorganizedaccordingtoa collectiv-
ist, traditionalmodel. This modelwas appropriatewhen thestronglyprotection-
istnationalagriculturalpolicyprevailed,buttodayEuropeanUnionpolicies place
other demands. The cooperatives now face international competition where the
main competitors are larger firms that have lower costs and can market their
productsatlowerprices. The traditionalcooperativeform is thenseentobeinap-
propriate. Market adaptation is insufficient when the societies are designed to
stimulateproductionoflargevolumes. Productionis notwelladaptedto the spe-
cific demandsofdifferentmarketsegments. Thecostandpricelevelsare notcom-
petitive when foreign competitors workunder moreliberal conditions.
Thesolutionwouldbe to transfer to a cooperativemodel thatinducesfarmers
to alignthemselvestoward marketrequirementsandefficiency. Itis questionable
as to whether subsidies flowing between different member categories are effec-
tive, since they lead to a non-optimalstructureofprimaryproduction.Far-reach-
ing individualization ofownership, market signals, and membership controlare
required. In other words, the development must proceed toward a proportional
cooperative model.
However, strong social and political forces hinder such a remodeling of the
agriculturalcooperativesectorinSweden.The currentlawoncooperativesociet-
ies preventsa conversiontoeconomicallyrationalcooperation,buttherearegood
prospects for animminentrevision ofthe legislation. Amore difficult problemis
eliminating the bad will that agricultural cooperation has experienced among
manypoliticiansandcivilservants. This hasled to a lawoncompetitiondesigned
to promote non-cooperative competitors, which is the equivalent of weakening
the position of thecooperatives. This is takingplaceatthe sametimeas competi-
tion from the rest ofEurope is growingstrong on theSwedish market.
Nonetheless, the greatest hindrance to change is ofa social character. Among
the farmers there is strong support for the current traditional form of coopera-
tion-the tradition from former days is strong. The existing cooperative model
has given considerablepowerto a majority ofsmall-scaleand part-timefarmers,
and a large share of the members are elderly-consequently with a weak incen-
tivefor renewal. Probably, however,theongoingstructuralconversionwithinag-
riculturetowardlargerandfewer farmswillresultina shiftinmentalitywhereby,
withinsomeyears, therewillbevoicesheardurgingserviceatcost, proportional-
ity, market orientation, and cost efficiency as lodestars for agricultural
cooperatives.
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